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40 IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.
THE NEW SCHOOL OF ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.
C. C. NUTTING.
The title of this paper is in one sense a misnomer, from the
fact that the prophets of the new school are inclined to deny
any real psychology to animals. According to Morgan, mind
is the wave of consciousness in its continuity.* Thorndyke
says that " The mental stream is not continuous in animals, "f
If this is true, animals can not be said to have minds, and hence
animal psychology can not exist.
However this may be, a discussion of those activities which
have here before been regarded as psychical in animals forms
the theme of a work embodying the views of the most radical
of recent writers on comparative psychology.
This work is from the pen of Dr. Edward L. Thorndyke,
fellow in psychology in Columbia University, and appeared in.
the form of a Monograph supplement in the Psychological Review
of June, 1898. The views advanced therein are so iconoclastic
that one rubs his. eyes before realizing that these views are
quite seriously advanced as the outcome of a great number of
ingenious experiments reduced to the form of diagrams, time
curves, etc.
The animals experimented with were cats, dogs and chicks,
and they were taught to get out of variously contrived boxes
under the stimulus of hunger, food being the invariable
reward for success, and continued hunger the result of failure.
These boxes were contrived with undeniable ingenuity and
were so constructed that the animal experimented with could
escape by its own activity. The act of opening the box was of
various degre es of complexity from a simple pressure to three
separate movements, such as clawing, pushing and biting.
The hungry animal was placed in one of these boxes and
the time in which it accomplished its exit was noted. As
soon as escape was effected the animal was fed. This process
"Introduction to Comparative Psychology, p. 26.
tAnimal Intelligence, p. 99.
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was repeated many times with the same animal, the time being
always noted, until the appropriate act was thoroughly learned,
and performed as soon as the animal found itself in the box.
Then the progress of the education was platted in the form of
a time curve for future study.
The following are the main conclusions drawn by Dr. Thorn-
dyke from these experiments:
First. —The animals never thought about their situation at
all, but out of a multitude of what might be called instinctive
activities, such as clawing, pushing, etc., happened to hit upon
the act that opened the door.
This successful act resulted in pleasure ( i. e. food) and by
repetition these pleasurable acts are "stamped in " and the
proper assosiation is formed through experience, while the
unsuccessful acts are "stamped out " by the absence of pleas
ure.
It may be objected that the conclusion that the animal does
not think about its situation at all is entirely gratuitous. It
would not, in my opinion, be at all unreasonable to claim that
the animal was doing a deal of thinking and that his thoughts
might take some such shape as this. "This is unpleasant and
I want to get out. I will try all sorts of ways, such as scratch
ing, clawing and pushing until I find a way to escape. ' ' Shut a
hungry small boy in a tight box and he would have numerous
thoughts although he would probably act very much as the cat
did, except that he would pound and kick and push instead of
scratching and clawing and pushing.
Dr. Thorndyke is so impressed with the importance of his
own conclusion that he says, "Surely every one must agree
that no man now has a right to advance theories about what is
in an animal's mind, or ta deny previous theories unless he sup
ports his theories by systematic and extended experiments."
(Page 31.)
In other words the naturalist who may have spent the better
part of a lifetime in carefully observing animals in a state of
nature, must forever hold his peace in the presence of one who
has put numerous cats in boxes, thus subjecting them to utterly
unnatural conditions, conditions that would be more likely to
inhibit than to encourage normal psychic acts.
Second. —Animals do not draw inferences, neither do they
reason.
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This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the animals give
no evidence of observation of their surroundings, or of delibera
tion.
The author can hardly find words for his contempt for those
who believe that animals reason. He says: "So, although it
is in a way superfluous to give the coup de grace to the despised
theory that animals reason, I think it is worth while to settle
this question once for all. " (Page 39.) Again he says: "I
should claim that this quarrel ought now to be dropped for
good and all * * * I should claim that the psychologist
who studies dogs and cats in order to defend this ' reason '
theory is on a level with the zoologist who should study fishes
with a view to supporting the thesis that they possessed clawed
digits." (Page 46.)
Third. —Animals do not imitate. —Finding that birds doimitate,
he, very wisely, leaves them out of this discussion. The cases
of imitation are " regarded as a specialization removed from
the general course of mental development, just as thefeathers
or aortic arch of birds are particular specializations of no con
sequence for the physical development of mammals. "(Page 47.)
The kind of specialization investigated by our author is
illustrated by the man who, seeing another turn a faucet, turns
a faucet himself to get a drink. In other words, ' ' from an
act witnessed he learns to do the act "
The experiments bearing on this question may be illustrated
by the following:
A pen was so constructed that a chick could get out either
by crawling under a wire screen or walking up an inclined
place. A chick who had learned to crawl under the screen was
placed in this pen with an inexperienced chick. In nine
minutes and twenty seconds the first chick crawled under nine
times, and at the end of that time the other walked up the
inclined plane and got out. "It was impossible to judge how
many times the inexperienced chick actually saw the perform
ance of the other. "
Another inexperienced chick was tried in the same way and
crawled under the wire in four minutes and twenty seconds, his
companion having in the meantime crawled under four times.
Now this would appear to be imitation, but no ! The author
says that probably he went under "not by imitation but by
accident. ' '
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Here we have a clear case of "Heads I win, tails you lose."
In the first experiment the inexperienced chick did not go
under the screen, and in the second it did go under. It would
have been manifestly impossible for that chick to give evidence
of imitation.
Dr. Thorndyke admits that he can not insist upon these
experiments as evidence against imitation.
Similar experiments with cats usually gave negative results.
Every case in which, imitation appeared to be present is
explained away, ingeniously it is true, but not by any means in
a manner convincing to the unbiased reader.
Dogs were experimented with, the results being always
negative.
Dr. Thorndyke sums up the evidence regarding imitation as
follows: "It seems sure from these experiments that the
animals were unable to form an association leading to an act
from having seen another animal or animals perform the act
in a certain situation. " "Not only do animals not have asso
ciations accompanied, more or less permeated and altered, by
inference and judgment; they do not have associations of the
sort which may be acquired from other animals by imitation."
" But in any case the burden of proof would now seem to rest
upon the adherents of imitation." (Page 62.)
Now it so happens that the present wriier is in possession
of such proof, and it is perfectly logical to claim that one posi
tive case of imitation will justly outweigh any number of
experiments with purely negative results. It happens, more
over, that the animal observed was a kitten.
This kitten was as wild as any that lives in the forest, and
had the misfortune to fall into the brick flue through which
cold air reaches the furnace in my house. The flue is about
seven feet high, three feet wide and eighteea inches deep.
From the bottoaa a double series of large tiles leads to a cham
ber beneath the furnace, in which there was at that time no
fire.
Various attempts to capture the kitten resulted in its dart
ing into the tiles. Efforts were made to prevent this by drop
ping a wire window screen in front of the openings to the tiles.
These efforts failing, the screei was left leaning against the
opposite wall of the flue. The mother of the kitten was
then placed in the flue in the hope that she would carry her
offspring, or induce it to follow her, through the tiles and out of
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an opening from the chamber under the lurnace to the cellar.
This failed, probably because the kitten was unable to make a
jump of about eighteen inches from the chamber to the open
ing into the cellar.
This latter opening was then closed so that the old cat would
be forced to remain, and possibly nurse the kitten, which she
refused to do, but jumped to the top of the screen and then
out. The kitten attempted to follow her. climbed to the top of
the screen, but could not jump the rest of the way.
Another screen was now placed on top of the first one so-
that the two together reached the top of the flue. The kit
ten very soon climbed nearly to the top, but was frightened and
dropped down. She tried again and again and finally succeeded
inmaking her escape. Now, although a careful watch had been
kept she had not been seen to attempt to climb the first screen
during the day and a half that it was in the flue before the
mother was put in.
It might be thought that the kitten followed the mother by
scent. But the mother had not climbed the upper screen at all!'
Neither did the kitten follow by sight, as it was several
minutes after the escape of the mother that the second screen
was introduced.
This appears to me to be as clear a case of imitation as-
could be conceived of, and I believe that anyone who has not
prejudged the case will so regard it.
That Dr. Thorndyke has taken the position of an attorney
for the prosecution of animals on the charge of being without
mentality, is demonstrated by his treatment of the answers to-
a set of questions propounded to a number of professional
animal trainers, five of whom, trainers of acknowledged repu
tation-, responded. Four of the five believed that animate
would learn through imitation, and one did not. This evidence
not being to the liking of our author, was put out of court in
the following language: "I cannot find that trainers make
any pract cal use of imitation in teaching animals tricks*, and
on the whole I think these replies leave the matter just where
it was before. They are mere opinions —not records of
observed facts. " (Page 64.)
* See " The Nature of Animal Intelligence and the Methods of Investing it."
Psychological Review, May, 1899, pp. 268-9, for Prof. Wesley Mills' discussion of this
point.
5
Nutting: The New School of Animal Psychology
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1899
IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. 45
I think that no injustice is done Dr. Thorndyke when I state
•candidly that his position, throughout the entire discussion, is
not a judicial one. That he starts out to prove the thesis that
the mentality of animals is much lower than heretofore sup
posed, and that this attitude constantly impairs the reliability
of his conclusions.
After having denied the power of inference and of imitation,
the author still further demolishes the work of his predeces
sors by the statement that "the ground- work of animal associ
ations is not the association of ideas, but the association of
idea or sense impression with impulse." (Page 71.)
Impulse is defined as ' ' the consciousness a muscular inner -
vation apart from that feeling of the act which comes from
^seeing one's self move, from feeling one's body in a different
position, etc. " Dr. Thorndyke does not believe that an animal
•can supply that impulse when it thinks of that act. For instance
a cat can not go into a box by virtue of the thought of going
in. It can not say to itself, "I will!" There must be the
muscular inner vation, accompanied by the consciousness that
makes up the impulse. This matter, however, involves too
elaborate a discussion to be followed here, interesting as it
might be so to do.
Finally we come to the most astounding statement of all,
which is the following:" The possibility is that animals may have no images or
memories at all, no ideas to associate. Perhaps the ent'refact
of association in animals is the presence of sense impressions
with which are associated, by result and pleasure, certain
impulses, and that therefore, and therefore only, a certain
-situation brings forth a certain act."" (Page 73.)
The author believes that acts of recognition, for inst ince,
may not be accompanied by any feeling of recognitioa at all.
We here arrive at as bald an automatism as could well be
imagiaed. The following sentence will best convey Dr. Thorn-
dyke's meaning: " A sense impression, of me gets associated
in my dog's mind with the impulses to jump on me, lick my
hand and wag his tail, though he has not and never had any
representation of me. " (Page 74.)
Now it may be claimed that I have not done justice to the
author under discussion because I have not given the arguments
whereby he supports his theories. This course would, how
ever, be impossible in the scop 3 of this paper. I have tried to
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give merely an idea of his methods and his conclusion?. His
monograph should be read by all who are interested in the sub
ject of comparative psychology.
He is fairly entitled to much credit for his patience in devis
ing and conducting experiments. In my opinion, however,
this kind of experimentation is not the best method of solving
the problems connected with the mentality of the lower animal?,
because it is certainly impaired by the unnaturalness of the
whole procedure. Continuous handling, repeated confinement
in boxes, and the pangs of hunger would surely and profundly
affect the mental machinery of any person or animal.
The true method , it seems to me, is neither the piling up of
anecdotes on the one hand, nor the cat and box method on the
other, but careful, unbiased observation of animals that are not
under pressure of excitement or hunger and are free to act on
their own initiative. I would add, moreover, that they should,
so far as possible, be ignorant of the fact that they are being
watched.
To my mind the most serious criticism that can be made of
the monograph under discussion is in reference to the attitude
of its author toward previous writers and also toward his own
work. It is not likely that the present generation of working nat
uralists, aside from the immediate friends of Dr. Thorndyke,
will readily forgive his unconcealed contempt for such a man
as Romanes, a man honored and loved by practically all his con
temporaries and a naturalist who, in the minds of many,
deserves to be class 3d among the foremost thinkers of his time.
Before quoting from Romanes, Dr. Thorndyke says: "These
passages give an admirable illustration of an attitude of inves
tigation which this research* will, I hope, render impossible for
any scientist of the future. " (Page 40.)
He sharply criticises the attitude of previous writers in the
following words: "Ho wean scientists who act like lawyers
defending animals against the charge of having no power of
rationality, be at the same time impartial judgeson the bench?"
(Page 4.)
Now I feel confident that no one, not a partisan of Dr.
Thorndyke, can read his work without concluding that he
clearly occupies the position of prosecuting attorney in this
same case, and is, therefore, equally disqualified from acting
•Dr. Thorndyke here refers to his own work.
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as judge. He rigidly excludes or at least minimizes every
particle of evidence in favor oE the accused.
In proof of this statement, witness his treatment of cats
that do not come up, or rather down, to his expectations, and
his naive brushing aside of the testimony of the animal train
ers whose evidence is most damaging to his theories. For my
own part, I still adhere to the belief that the argument sub
mitted to this body in a former paper*, based on the multitude
of homologies between man and the higher mammalia is a
sound one, and that if this argument is to be overthrown it
must be through careful observations of animals that are not
psychologically disabled by starvation and imprisonment in
boxes, however ingeniously contrived. And I further protest
that the men who have gained their knowledge of animals by
direct observation of animals in the field, have still their right
to be heard on this question ; that their observations demand
consideration, and their opinions respect. In short, the old
style field naturalist refuses to be ruled out of court by
the experimental psychogolist of the new school. He emphatic
ally denies jurisdiction, and appeals to the unbiased verdict
of thoughtful men.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREST TREES IN IOWA.
BY B. SHIMEK.
The discussion of the origin of our prairies, and of the dis
tribution of our nitive forest trees, is as old as our knowledge
of the central northwest. The earlier discussions were based
on a knowledge of conditions as they existed when the white
man first appeared in this section, and, though some of them
are crude, and based upon insufficient observation, they fortu
nately give us at least a partial record of those conditions.
Later observers have the advantage of the results of a vast
number of attempts at tree-planting, which have subjected
existing conditions to a practical test, and which throw con
siderable light upon the causes which perpetuated the treeless
prairies. From the very nature of the case, however, it is
quite as difficult now to exactly distinguish in some cases
* " Do the IJower Animals Reason? " Proceedings Iowa Academy of Sciences, 1897
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